



Space, Missiles, Command, and Control

PREVENTING AND RESISTING AIRCRAFT PIRACY (HIJACKING)

This instruction implements AFD 13-2, *Air Traffic, Airspace, Airfield, and Range Management*. It provides guidelines for preventing and resisting hijacking attempts on US Air Force aircraft or military contract civil aircraft. To contribute supplements or implementing instructions, contact Headquarters Air Force Flight Standards Agency, Airfield Management Division (HQ AFFSA/XVA) 1535 Command Dr, Suite D309, Andrews AFB MD 20331-7002.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This revision aligns the instruction with AFD 13-2. Existing information has been reorganized and the following changes were made: adds definition of transponder code 7700; and deletes specific flightline security requirements, definitions for Air Force aircraft and installations.

1. General Information:

1.1. **Civil Aircraft.** Any aircraft which does not belong to the Department of Defense (DoD) or another government agency, fall into this category.

1.2. **Delegation of Authority and Designation of Officials.** In accordance with the *Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Between the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Department of Defense (DoD) Concerning Air Piracy* (7 September 1978):

1.2.1. **DoD Designated Official.** Until the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Administrator is otherwise notified in writing by the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Director for Operations (National Military Command Center (NMCC)), or the official acting in that capacity, will act on behalf of DoD and will coordinate with FAA and its designated official. For the purposes of this publication, this term applies to the National Military Command Center (NMCC) Deputy Director for Operations, Pentagon, Washington DC 20301-5000.

1.2.2. **FAA Designated Official.** Until the Secretary of Defense is otherwise notified in writing by the FAA Administrator, the Director, Office of Civil Aviation Security, or the official acting in that capacity, will act on behalf of the FAA and will coordinate with DoD and its designated official. For the purposes of this publication, this term applies to the Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security, HQ FAA, Washington DC 20591-5000.

1.2.3. **In-Flight (Aircraft).** The condition of an aircraft from the moment when all external doors are closed following embarkation until the moment one such door is opened for disembarkation.

1.2.3.1. Any question as to whether any aircraft, covered by the MOU between the DOT and DoD, is "in-flight" or not "in-flight" shall be referred to the FAA designated official.

1.2.3.2. In the case of a forced landing, an aircraft is "in-flight" until competent authorities take over.

1.3. **Special Aircraft Under the Jurisdiction of the United States.** Aircraft under FAA jurisdiction as specified by law include:

1.3.1. Civil aircraft in the United States.

1.3.2. National defense forces of the United States.

1.3.3. Any other aircraft within the United States.

1.3.4. Any other aircraft originating outside the United States that:

1.3.4.1. Will arrive in or depart from the United States on its next flight.

1.3.4.2. Lands in the United States with hijackers onboard.

Supersedes AFR 60-14, 11 September 1987.

OPR: HQ AFFSA/XVA (MSgt David F. Craig, Jr.)

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Pages: 9/Distribution: F



1.3.4.3. Is leased without a crew to someone who lives in the United States or who does business primarily in the United States.

1.4. **Aircraft Transponder Code (ATC) 7500.** Aircrews use this electronic aircraft signal to alert ground control to a hijacking attempt.

1.5. **Aircraft Transponder Code (ATC) 7700.** Aircrew members use this electronic aircraft signal to alert ground control to an in-flight emergency. **NOTE:** When used immediately after ATC acknowledges code 7500, code 7700 means "Situation appears desperate, want armed intervention."

1.6. **United States.** For the purposes of this instruction, the United States encompasses the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and territories and possessions of the United States, including the territorial waters and overlying airspace.

2. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and Department of Defense (DoD) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). This document specifies agency responsibilities in the event of an attempted or actual hijacking.

2.1. This instruction outlines provisions of the MOU, which were formulated under the following assumptions:

2.2. The hijacking of a US military or military-contract aircraft could create an international incident and seriously jeopardize the safety of passengers and property.

2.3. No one has created an all-inclusive, step-by-step procedure to stop a hijacking attempt. The procedures outlined in this document serve only as guidelines. Personnel may use their own judgment as circumstances change.

2.4. Hijackers initiate their attacks most often after the aircrew boards and gets the aircraft ready for takeoff.

2.5. Hijacking may be committed by political terrorists or individuals to whom the threat of death may be a stimulant rather than a deterrent. Therefore, personnel may be asked to use specialized law enforcement techniques in order to stop a hijacking attempt.

2.6. Personnel have been most effective when they delay hijackers and negotiate with them.

3. Authority:

3.1. **US Air Force.** The Headquarters, Air Force Flight Standards Agency, delegates Air Force executive agent responsibilities to its Airfield Management Division, HQ AFFSA/XVA, for preventing and resisting hijackings. HQ AFFSA/XVA is authorized direct contact with appropriate US federal agencies, US Air Force major commands (MAJCOM), overseas unified commands, and other military services to develop policies, procedures, and joint exercises to prevent and resist hijackings.

3.2. **FAA.** In accordance with Public Law 93-366, the FAA administrator is vested with exclusive responsibility

for the direction of law enforcement activity during a hijacking involving in-flight aircraft within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the United States. (The FBI has jurisdiction when the aircraft is not in-flight.) If the hijacking occurs overseas, the host nation, in coordination with the Department of State (DOS) and DoD, manages intervention.

4. Policy:

4.1. United States:

4.1.1. The United States does not give in to the demands of hijackers.

4.1.2. US policy states that host nation personnel will manage hijackings within their borders, even if hijackers capture DoD aircraft.

4.2. US Air Force:

4.2.1. The US Air Force works to prevent hijackings by detecting potential hijackers before they board an aircraft.

4.2.2. Should preventive efforts fail, the US Air Force will resist the hijackers. Refer to AFI 31-209, *Air Force Resource Protection Program*, and DoD Handbook 2000-12, *Protection of DoD Personnel Against Terrorist Acts*, February 1993, with Change 1, for general policy, command authority, and guidelines on dealing with terrorists.

4.2.3. In the case of an aircraft carrying passengers, the US Air Force acts primarily to ensure the safety of the passengers.

4.2.4. Civil agencies forward all requests for support to the NMCC, which exercises authority over DoD chase planes.

4.2.4.1. MAJCOMs respond to the NMCC's commands, which may include providing chase or transport aircraft, helicopters, flares, parachutes, and communications equipment.

4.2.4.2. The authority in charge of resisting a hijacking attempt (civil or military) assists the pilot in command of the aircraft.

4.3. **Interagency.** As covered by the *MOU Between the DOT and the DoD Concerning Aircraft Piracy*, the DoD, DOS, Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), and FAA fully cooperate with one another during a hijacking attempt to ensure an efficient exchange of information and effective management. These agencies will not initiate unilateral actions.

5. Responsibilities:

5.1. Notification:

5.1.1. Wing commanders immediately notify the NMCC of a hijacking through MAJCOM Operations Centers and Command Posts, and Air Force Operations Support Centers.

5.1.1.1. NMCC then notifies the DOS, FAA, and the FBI.

5.1.1.2. Meanwhile, the DoD wing commander on or near the incident site notifies the US Embassy and host nation law enforcement officials.

5.1.1.3. Wing commanders continuously report new developments to the NMCC via the JCS operational reporting system.

5.1.2. If hijackers capture a DoD aircraft away from a DoD installation, DOS notifies the NMCC.

5.1.3. The DoD notifies the DOS, FBI, and FAA personnel at the scene of a hijacking when an aircraft is carrying weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear weapons, or documents, equipment, or material which the DoD considers sensitive.

5.1.3.1. Refer to DoD 5100.52-M, *Nuclear Weapon Accident Response Procedures*, September 1990, and the CJCS Nuclear Weapons Recovery Plan for guidelines on managing incidents affecting aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. **NOTE:** US policy states that hijacked aircraft carrying nuclear weapons may not be released for takeoff.

5.2. **Aircraft Within the United States.** For aircraft hijacked within the United States:

5.2.1. FAA and FBI officials determine whether the use of law enforcement action is necessary, and after considering the expressed wishes of the pilot-in-command and DoD representatives, take action.

5.2.2. Officials at the national level decide whether to release or assault the hijacked aircraft.

5.2.2.1. DoD, FBI, and FAA officials work together at the scene.

5.3. **Overseas Aircraft:**

5.3.1. DOS must work with the host government during the hijacking of a DoD aircraft.

5.3.2. DOS dispatches a representative to the scene when hijackers take over a DoD aircraft at an overseas military installation.

5.3.2.1. DOS and DoD manage an incident until the on-scene commander fully briefs the host nation's commander and responsibility is transferred. DoD, DOS, and host nation personnel work out a strategy.

5.3.2.2. Should the host nation decline incident responsibility, DOS determines the appropriate US action.

6. **Installation Planning:**

6.1. Commanders of Air Force installations with an actively used runway must develop plans to resist and manage possible hijackings.

6.2. At joint-use or shared-use airfields, MAJCOMs must develop a plan for DoD areas and work with civil airport authorities.

6.3. Plans must include items listed in table 1 of this instruction.

7. **Hijack Prevention:**

7.1. Wing commanders must implement procedures to prevent unauthorized access to aircraft on base.

7.2. **Flightline Security.** Familiarize command post personnel, tower personnel, and security police with the covert signals specified in table 1 (see AFI 31-101, *Air Force Physical Security Program*).

7.3. **Aircrews.** To prevent hijack attempts:

7.3.1. Inspect the exterior and interior of each aircraft.

7.3.2. Search aircraft.

7.3.3. Monitor aircraft maintenance.

7.3.4. Prevent unauthorized access to aircraft.

7.3.5. Oversee the passengers boarding and loading their cabin baggage.

7.3.6. Deny passengers access to luggage they've stored in the cabin.

7.3.7. Deny unauthorized passengers access to the flight deck.

7.3.8. Learn the procedures outlined in attachment 1 and use the crisis guidelines in attachment 2.

7.4. **Transportation Personnel (Air Passenger Terminal) Processing Passengers:**

7.4.1. Inform passengers that they can't carry weapons or explosives aboard. If authorized weapons are carried onboard, notify aircrew of seating location of individual(s) with weapons.

7.4.2. Establish a passenger screening process for travelers and validating their travel documents.

7.4.3. Inspect all passengers and carryon luggage by looking through bags and frisking, or with X-ray machines and walk-through or handheld metal detectors.

7.4.3.1. Keep passengers who have passed through the inspection point under surveillance in a sterile area until they board.

7.4.3.2. Exempt classified materials held by official couriers from these inspections.

7.4.3.3. Conduct all inspections with the highest standards of military courtesy.

7.4.3.4. Stop passengers who refuse to comply with screening requirements from boarding a plane.

7.5. **Major Command (MAJCOM).** MAJCOMs may exempt certain individuals or groups from passenger screening and baggage inspections provided that they:

7.5.1. Grant only rare exemptions.

7.5.2. Brief MAJCOM commanders and make sure they concur with established MAJCOM exemptions.

7.5.3. Ensure that the senior member (officer or enlisted) of any team, group, or unit exempted from screening and baggage inspections certifies that the team members pose no hijacking threat and don't carry prohibited items.

7.5.4. Don't exempt unit travel from screening and baggage inspections except for deployments to exercise locations or during contingencies. For example: don't exempt personnel in military units moving to and from summer training.

- 7.5.5. Understand that local authorities must periodically evaluate the processing of any exempted individual or group.
- 7.5.6. Ensure that aerial port personnel perform passenger screenings and processing at military passenger terminals.
- 7.5.6.1. At military passenger terminals, don't assign security and law enforcement personnel for this job.
- 7.5.6.2. At locations without full terminal operation, refer to local directives for the agency that should be assigned to passenger screenings.
- 7.5.7. Protect passengers between the passenger processing point and the aircraft.
- 7.5.8. Oversee baggage from the time passengers check it in until workers load it on the aircraft.
- 7.5.9. Remove unattended and unidentified baggage from the passenger processing point.
- 7.5.10. Develop procedures to evacuate passengers from the terminal or processing point in the event of a bomb threat.
- 7.5.11. Ensure that individuals can't bypass the security and screening process.
- 7.5.11.1. Lock doors leading to the flightline apron when not in use.
- 7.5.11.2. Install alarms on emergency exits.
- 7.5.11.3. Lock unattended vehicles used to transport passengers and keep them under surveillance.
- 7.5.11.4. At passenger processing points install duress alarms that sound at security police stations.

8. Hijack Resistance:

- 8.1. **Response Forces.** Until the FAA, host nation, or FBI personnel arrive on the scene, military response forces:
- 8.1.1. Resist, through dissuasion, subterfuge, or force, all attempts by unauthorized people to overtake a military aircraft.
- 8.1.2. Delay aircraft movement with vehicles that block taxiways and runways and other strategies to allow time for coordinating resistance and establishing local and off-the-airfield communications.
- 8.1.2.1. Don't block landing aircraft until they clear the runway.
- 8.1.2.2. Direct hijacked aircraft to a pre-designated parking space (see table 1, item 3).
- 8.1.2.3. Consult the highest available level of command to authorize discontinuance of ground delaying tactics. When you can't maintain communication with the NMCC, or when you don't have time to consult that agency, consult the following authorities in this order:
- The MAJCOM responsible for the aircraft.
 - The MAJCOM responsible for the airfield.
 - The senior operational commander at the airfield.
 - The aircraft commander.
- 8.1.2.4. At overseas locations, DOS, in conjunction with host nation and DoD officials, determines when to discontinue delaying tactics. If the host nation forces are unavailable follow the procedures outlined in paragraph 8.1.2.3.

- 8.1.3. Plan assaults on hijacked planes and brief the on-scene commander.
- 8.1.3.1. Work out strategies with the NMCC when time allows.
- 8.1.3.2. Employ armed Air Force security police teams to assault hijacked aircraft only in the absence of FBI or host nation law enforcement units such as tactical teams or when violence escalates and lives are in danger.
- 8.1.4. Notify the NMCC by OPREP telephonic report of all hijacking attempts. Provide follow up reports as required.
- 8.2. **Aircrews.** Follow the procedures outlined in attachment 1.

9. Forced Penetration of Unfriendly Airspace. US

- aircrews piloting hijacked aircraft in unfriendly airspace:
- 9.1. Comply with radio or air-intercept instructions given by the unfriendly nation before crossing boundaries.
- 9.2. Follow these guidelines if the unfriendly nation makes no contact before you approach a boundary:
- 9.2.1. Maintain a true airspeed of not more than 400 knots.
- 9.2.2. Maintain an altitude of between 10,000 and 25,000 feet.
- 9.2.3. Fly a direct course toward the hijacker's destination.
- 9.2.4. Transmit the international distress signal, "MAYDAY," on any of the international distress frequencies (243.0 MHz, 121.5 MHz, 2182 kHz).
- 9.2.5. Set Mode 3, Code 7700, on the transponder.
- 9.2.6. Follow the procedures specified in flight information publication supplements if you can't establish radio contact with the unfriendly nation.
- 9.3. Attempt to dispose of or destroy classified documents or equipment onboard before landing in an unfriendly nation.

10. Civil Contract Aircraft:

- 10.1. **Armed Intervention by DoD Forces:**
- 10.1.1. Military forces don't assault without consulting the FAA, the FBI, and civil air carrier managers. When possible, the expressed wishes of the pilot will be considered.
- 10.1.2. Air Force personnel may detain any suspicious or disorderly person on a military installation until civil authorities arrive on the scene.
- 10.2. **Airlift Contracts and Procedures:**
- 10.2.1. Military agencies administering airlift contracts must work with air-carrier representatives to develop procedures for helping people onboard a civil aircraft hijacked on a DoD base.
- 10.2.1.1. The air carrier must satisfy the requirements of the FAA Air Carrier Standard Security Program.
- 10.2.2. The contract agreed to by these parties must clearly specify responsibilities of personnel in charge of processing civilian passengers and security procedures for civilian airports used by DoD passenger.

11. Pursuit by Chase Aircraft:**11.1. Destination Cuba:**

11.1.1. Notify US Commander In Chief Atlantic Command (USCINCLANT) immediately when the hijackers set a course for Cuba. USCINCLANT may stop any chase South of 24 degrees North.

11.1.2. The chase aircraft may not approach closer than 12 miles off Cuba or its islands.

11.1.3. Chase aircraft must remain out of cockpit and cabin view of the hijacked aircraft.

11.2. Destinations Other Than Cuba:

11.2.1. Chase aircraft pursuing a hijacker headed for a country other than Cuba:

- Break away at the outer limit of the country's claimed territorial sea or 12 miles from land, whichever is less, and wait for overflight clearance.
- Stop at the border of countries touching the United States and wait for overflight clearance.
- Remain out of cockpit and cabin view of the hijacked aircraft.

Table 1. Hijacking Prevention Procedures for Installations.

At joint-use military and civil airfields, flying unit commanders must comply with the following requirements and work with the Civil Airport Manager to establish procedures.	US	OVERSEAS
1. Conduct at least one annual hijacking prevention and resistance exercise as well as annual training for disaster response forces, negotiators, installation commanders, law enforcement officers, and aircrews that frequently carry passengers. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • With MAJCOM approval, you may conduct this training biannually. • Participation in a hijack prevention or resistance exercise satisfies personnel training requirements. 	YES	YES
2. Notify the Director, National Security Agency (DIRNSA/G5), of scheduled training, and send a copy of the message. Send an informational copy to NSOC, G56, G509, and BSAC, Ft George G. Meade MD 20755-5092, 5 duty days prior to an exercise and immediately upon cancellation. NOTE: Address messages to DIRNSA/FT GEORGE G MEADE MD//G5//. Enter the phrase "Pass to NSOC, G56, G509, and BSAC" before the subject line. Include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • General exercise scenario, communications equipment, communications frequencies, nicknames, call words (if any), and inclusive times. • The classification For Official Use Only on all correspondence. (You may classify especially sensitive material at a higher level.) Mark all messages EFTO (encrypt for transmission only). • An informational copy of your training plan for HQ AMC/XOVT, 402 Scott Dr, Rm 132, Scott AFB IL, 62225-5363 (HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//XOVT//), if you use Air Mobility Command (AMC) aircraft or other assets. • An informational copy of all correspondence to HQ AFFSA/XVA, 1535 Command Dr, Suite D309, Andrews AFB MD, 20331-7002 (HQ AFFSA WASHINGTON DC//XV//). 	YES	YES
3. Designate at least one parking area for parking a hijacked aircraft. Choose a location away from other assets that gives access to and cover for law enforcement agents as well as communications tie-in capability.	YES	YES
4. Create procedures for notifying receiving and accommodating host nation, US Embassy, and US military personnel. Plan ahead for speedy transfer of jurisdiction to the host nation	NO	YES
5. Create procedures to notify and receive FAA and FBI personnel.	YES	NO
6. Designate a facility to accommodate FAA and FBI personnel. Include an isolated area for up to six negotiators.	YES	NO
7. Designate a facility to accommodate host nation and unified command personnel. This space should include an isolated area for up to six negotiators.	NO	YES

8. Make a briefing checklist for FAA, FBI (US only), and on-scene commanders. Include these:	YES	YES
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A synopsis of the hijacking. • Deployment or location of security police. • Delaying tactics in effect. • Negotiations. • A diagram of the aircraft's exterior and interior aircraft status, and amount of fuel on board. • Number of onboard passengers, hijackers, crew, and any hazardous cargo, and their locations. • Available information on crew, passengers, and hijackers, and copies of passenger manifest and crew orders. • Types of weapons and explosives carried by hijackers and aircrew. • Types of communications available for contacting the hijacker. • The availability of another aircraft of the same type as hijacked aircraft, for law enforcement training. • The aircraft's flap configuration and its implications. 		
9. Confirm your ability to communicate with the NMCC through the appropriate MAJ command and FAA Command Center (US only).	YES	YES
10. Identify a trained negotiator and negotiating team.	YES	YES

Table 2. Covert Communications Signals.

	Situation:	Aircrew Action:	Air Traffic Controller Action:
1	We are being hijacked.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Set transponder to Mode 3, Code 7500, or 2. Transmit: "(aircraft call sign) transponder seven five zero zero." 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Acknowledge receipt of code 7500 by responding "(aircraft callsign) (name of facility) verify squawking 7500." 2. Acknowledge pilot's transmission of "Transponder seven five zero zero" by responding "(aircraft callsign) (name of facility) roger, transponder seven five zero zero." 3. Notify proper authorities regardless of whether the pilot replies.
2	We can't communicate in-the-clear from the aircraft.	Use the word "TRIP" after the aircraft callsign prefix when communicating by radio with ground agencies. For example: REACH "TRIP" 12345. . . . or TERRY "TRIP" 33	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Use "TRIP" after the aircraft callsign prefix to acknowledge that in-the-clear communication is not possible. 2. Use "TRIP" after the aircraft callsign prefix to ask if in-the-clear communication is possible. 3. Limit radio transmission to minimum ATC functions until otherwise advised.

3	Our situation appears desperate. We want armed intervention.	1. Either change the transponder from Mode 3, code 7500, to Mode 3, Code 7700, or 2. Transmit "(aircraft callsign) transponder seven seven zero zero."	1. Acknowledge receipt of code 7700 by transmitting "(aircraft callsign), (name of facility) now reading you on transponder seven seven zero zero." 2. Acknowledge pilot's transmission of "Transponder seven seven zero zero" by responding "(aircraft callsign) (name of facility) now reading your transponder seven seven zero zero." 3. Notify authorities. NOTE: Code 7700 may indicate an in-flight emergency in addition to the hijacking.
4	Our situation continues to be desperate. We want armed intervention and your efforts to keep the aircraft from taking off.	Either leave full flaps down after landing, lower full flaps after landing, or lower full flaps while on the ground. Transmit "(aircraft callsign) flaps are full down".	1. Acknowledge pilot's transmission of "Flaps are full down" by responding "(aircraft callsign) roger, flaps are full down". 2. Notify authorities.
5	Leave us alone; do not intervene.	Retract flaps after landing. NOTE: Pilots squawking code 7700, who retract flaps after landing, should return to code 7500 and remain there, unless the situation changes again. Transmit "(aircraft callsign) back on seven five zero zero" to emphasize the fact that they no longer want intervention.	1. Acknowledge receipt of code 7500 by responding "(aircraft callsign), (name of facility), now reading you on transponder seven five zero zero." 2. Notify authorities.

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2 Attachments

1. Actions During Hijack Attempts
2. Crisis Management Guidelines

ACTIONS DURING HIJACK ATTEMPTS

A1.1. Aircrews have been successful during previous hijackings by:

A1.1.1. Activating Transponder Code 7500.

A1.1.2. Landing at the nearest airfield.

A1.1.3. Escaping.

A1.1.4. Calming the hijackers with conversation and limiting words or actions that could irritate them.

A1.1.5. Avoiding startling movements.

A1.1.6. Remaining in the cockpit unless able to escape by moving around the aircraft.

A1.1.7. Instructing passengers to fasten their seat belts to reduce the potential for passenger heroics.

A1.1.8. Convincing the hijacker, with fact or subterfuge, to make intermediate stops.

A1.1.9. Proposing alternatives such as landing in a neutral country rather than one unfriendly to the United States.

A1.1.10. Exploiting any opportunity to disable or overcome the hijacker by physical force or with the prudent use of firearms.

A1.1.11. Notifying ground personnel by any means available of the attempted hijacking (see table 2).

A1.2. Air traffic controllers follow actions outlined in table 2.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES

A2.1. Although anyone might be thrust into the role of a negotiator, as a general rule, the negotiator should not be a senior management official such as a wing commander.

NOTE: This information is not designed to turn someone into a trained negotiator.

A2.2. Control tower, command post, or other personnel who may find themselves negotiating with a hijacker or terrorist:

A2.2.1. Alert base officials of the situation.

A2.2.2. Stall by talking. That's what negotiation means. Talking uses time and time is both an asset and an ally.

A2.2.3. Remain calm. Don't lose your temper or turn hostile or abusive.

A2.2.4. Tell the hijacker that you aren't in a position of authority and can't promise anything.

A2.2.5. Don't rush or try to single-handedly resolve the incident.

A2.2.6. Use neutral speech and a nonthreatening stance.

A2.2.7. If the hijacker starts making demands (for fuel, for example) pass the request to base officials immediately. Tell the hijacker when you have done so.

A2.2.8. Don't offer suggestions.

A2.2.9. Avoid setting deadlines.

A2.2.10. Listen. Keep good records of the hijacker's statements and demands, your responses, and any information about the number of people involved. Record your conversations, if possible.

A2.2.11. Don't ignore the hijacker. Keep talking.